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The construct of the “self” is conceived as being fundamental in promoting survival.
As such, extensive studies have documented preferential processing of self-relevant
stimuli. For example, attributes that relate to the self are better encoded and retrieved,
and are more readily consciously perceived. The preferential processing of self-relevant
information, however, appears to be especially true for physical (e.g., faces), as opposed
to psychological (e.g., traits), conceptions of the self. Here, we test whether semantic
attributes that participants judge as self-relevant are further processed unconsciously
than attributes that were not judged as self-relevant. In Experiment 1, a continuous flash
suppression paradigm was employed with “self” and “non-self” attribute words being
presented subliminally, and we asked participants to categorize unseen words as either
self-related or not. In a second experiment, we attempted to boost putative preferential
self-processing by relation to its physical conception, that is, one’s own body. To this
aim, we repeated Experiment 1 while administrating acoustic stimuli either close or far
from the body, i.e., within or outside peripersonal space. Results of both Experiment 1
and 2 demonstrate no difference in breaking suppression for self and non-self words.
Additionally, we found that while participants were able to process the physical location
of the unseen words (above or below fixation) they were not able to categorize these as
self-relevant or not. Finally, results showed that sounds presented in the extra-personal
space elicited a more stringent response criterion for “self” in the process of categorizing
unseen visual stimuli. This shift in criterion as a consequence of sound location was
restricted to the self, as no such effect was observed in the categorization of attributes
occurring above or below fixation. Overall, our findings seem to indicate that subliminally
presented stimuli are not semantically processed, at least inasmuch as to be categorized
as self-relevant or not. However, we do demonstrate that the distance at which acoustic
stimuli are presented may alter the balance between self- and non-self biases.
Keywords: self, criterion bias, peripersonal space, multisensory, audio, consciousness
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INTRODUCTION
The inherent complexity of the construct of the self, has
led to distinct conceptualizations typically including several
levels of “selfhood” (James, 1890; Damasio, 1996, 1999; Parnas,
2003; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Zahavi, 2005). At a
foundational level of the self is a pre-semantic and non-
conceptual understanding of the bodily self, which may serve
as a scaffold for more complex and abstracts understandings
of the self (Damasio, 1996, 1999; Gallagher, 2005; Legrand,
2006, 2007; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). The pre-reflective
level of self-representation has been suggested to be derived
from multisensory-motor correspondences (Blanke, 2012; Blanke
et al., 2015) and is thought to be developed at an early age
(Rochat, 1995, 2003; Filippetti et al., 2013). It is only at later
stages of development that higher-level semantic representations
of the self – such as the narrative or autobiographical self
(Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006) –
representing reflective conceptualizations of the self across time
and space are established (Rochat, 1995, 2003; Damasio, 1996,
1999; Baumeister, 1998). Thus, a core self-representation is
suggested to be grounded in the bodily self, while semantic
and psychological representations of the self are developed later,
putatively scaffolded upon the bodily-self representation, and
involving memory and cognitive constructs of oneself across time
and space (Arzy et al., 2008; Peer et al., 2015).
Both the bodily and the narrative conceptions of the self
have been described as a fundamental construct bearing on
human survival (Keenan et al., 2000; Humphrey, 2006) and
correspondingly, the processing of self-relevant information has
been shown to enjoy a privileged status (Yu and Blake, 1992; Tong
and Nakayama, 1999; Sugiura et al., 2000; Salomon et al., 2011,
2013). At the sensory level, an example of this privileged self-
processing can be observed in the so-called “cocktail party effect”
(Cherry, 1953; Wood and Cowan, 1995) in which one’s name is
automatically picked up by the auditory system among a sea of
sensory noise (see Schäfer et al., 2016, for a recent demonstration
of self-prioritization effects across various sensory modalities).
A similar “self-reference effect” (Rogers et al., 1977) has been
described for mnemonic processes in which information that is
encoded as being self-relevant is a posteriori better retained (Sui
and Humphreys, 2015). Further, it has recently been shown that
even an arbitrary and externally imposed relationship between
stimuli and the self causes enhanced processing of these stimuli
(Sui et al., 2012, 2013; Stein et al., 2016). Thus, seemingly
both at the sensory and at higher-order cognitive levels, self-
related stimuli may enjoy of enhanced or prioritized access to
awareness.
The bifurcation between the study of the bodily-self and a
narrative-self has nonetheless arguably led to neglecting possible
interactions between the sensory signals which are at the basis
of the bodily self and higher-order level processes relating to the
narrative self (see Canzoneri et al., 2016 for a recent exception).
Regarding the bodily-self, recent studies have shown that
coupling masked visual stimuli with related bodily signals
affects the emergence of the visual stimuli into awareness. Such
effects have been shown for proprioceptive (Salomon et al.,
2013), tactile (Lunghi et al., 2010; Lunghi and Alais, 2013;
Salomon et al., 2015a), vestibular (Salomon et al., 2015b), and
interoceptive signals (Salomon et al., 2016b). Our group, for
example, has demonstrated that pairing unseen visual stimuli
with a congruent body posture causes the unseen visual stimuli
to break continuous flash suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch,
2005; Jiang et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2011) faster than when
the stimuli is paired with incongruent proprioceptive signals
(Salomon et al., 2013). That is, when participants are presented
with highly visible and salient stimuli to their dominant eye
(e.g., “Mondrians”), and visual stimuli with a lesser contrast or
salience to their non-dominant eye (e.g., CFS paradigm), this
latter stimulus will break the Mondrian suppression and thus
access consciousness more readily when paired with a congruent
(vs. incongruent) body posture. Further, the co-localization of
sound and visual stimuli has equally been demonstrated to thrust
this latter one into awareness under a breaking CFS paradigm
(Aller et al., 2015). Similarly, using a related visual dichoptic
presentation paradigm, namely, binocular rivalry (see Alais and
Blake, 2005, for review), Lunghi et al. have demonstrated striking
interactions between the administration of touch and/or audio-
tactile stimulation and congruently presented visual stimuli in
propelling the latter one into awareness (Lunghi and Alais,
2013; Lunghi et al., 2014). Further, sensory signals presented not
only at the body, but also near the body, in the peripersonal
space (PPS; Serino et al., 2015), have been demonstrated to
heavily influence self-processing (Blanke et al., 2015; Noel
et al., 2015a, 2016; Salomon et al., 2016a), and to reference
conceptual processing (Canzoneri et al., 2016). Thus, sensory
signals from the body or within the PPS may affect the processing
of visual and self-related stimuli (see Faivre et al., 2015 for
review).
On the other hand, in relation to the preferential processing
of the semantic self, the scope and limits of unconscious
semantic processing have revealed contradictory results –
arguably in great measure as a consequence of the utilization
of different experimental paradigms (Hesselmann and Moors,
2015), but also due to distinct levels of association between
physical and psychological conceptions of the self. While
researchers employing unconscious priming (which may
arguably primarily index non-conscious processing, as opposed
to access to consciousness, as CFS does; Stein et al., 2011)
have demonstrated powerful effects of unconscious social
primes influencing posterior behavior (Bargh et al., 1996;
Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg, 2000), these subliminal
effects are not always present – in particular when scrutinizing
the possibility of observing subliminal semantic processing
(Zimba and Blake, 1983; Blake, 1988; Kang et al., 2011).
In fact, researchers have argued that the default stance
should be not to expect much (self or non-self) semantic
unconscious processing during incongruent dichoptic
presentation (Hesselmann and Moors, 2015), and Blake
(1988) inclusively reported that even the first name of a
specific observer, which represents a fundamental constituent
of the semantic self (Joubert, 1991) proved insufficient to alter
dominance of one percept (self) over another (non-self) under
a condition of dichoptic stimulation. Tacikowski and Ehrsson
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(2016) have recently reported a similar effect, in that even
one’s own name, when masked, was insufficient to act as a
self-prime.
Contrarily, recent studies utilizing a breaking CFS paradigm
have demonstrated a host of effects presumably relying on
unconscious semantic processing. Sklar et al. (2012), for
instance, have shown that semantically incoherent expressions
broke suppression (that is, “emerged” into visual awareness)
more readily than semantically coherent expressions. Similarly,
these researchers showed that increasing the negative affect of
expressions lowered suppression time significantly, and that
effortful arithmetic equations can be solved without awareness
(Sklar et al., 2012). Yet other groups have demonstrated that
emotional information is processed during suppression (Yang
et al., 2007), scene congruency information can be extracted
in the absence of visual awareness (Mudrik et al., 2011), and
that word meaning (Costello et al., 2009) and word valence
(Yang and Yeh, 2011) can be processed unconsciously. Further,
particularly with regard access to consciousness of self-relevant
information under the context of breaking CFS, Geng et al.
(2012) have demonstrated that one’s own face is detected more
rapidly than other faces, while Stein et al. (2016), did not
show the analogous effect when a visual stimulus (gabor) was
arbitrarily labeled “You” as opposed to “Other” (Stein et al.,
2016).
Overall, the recent demonstrations of semantic processing
under CFS beget the question whether an unconscious semantic
representation of the self can be processed unconsciously. The
prospect of revealing semantic self-processing unconsciously
has been troublesome, but evidence indicates that this prospect
may be bolstered by investigating semantic self-processing in
combination with lower-level understandings of the bodily self.
Here we investigated if participants are (i) able to process
self-relevant semantic stimuli unconsciously and (ii) if this is
modulated by task irrelevant stimuli, which tap into a specific
multisensory dimension of the bodily self, i.e., the PPS. In a
first experiment, we present participants with self-attributed
personality trait to their non-dominant eye, while presenting
dynamic high-contrast stimuli to their dominant one in order
to mask the self-attribute. Participants were then to categorize
the presented but unseen words as either self-related or not.
We tested whether participants were able to semantically process
self-related information inasmuch to appropriately categorize
the words as self-relevant or not. Successful categorization of
unseen words as either self-related or not is taken to index
unconscious self-processing and is thus the dependent variable
of interest here. That is, we questioned whether subjectively
invisible words could be nonetheless accurately classified as
self vs. non-self. In a second experiment, we tested whether
such putative self-effect could be modulated by a low-level
manipulation prioritizing the representation of the bodily self.
One key aspect of bodily self is its link to the body and to the
space immediately surrounding it, i.e., the PPS (Blanke, 2012;
Blanke et al., 2015; Noel et al., 2015a, 2016; Canzoneri et al.,
2016; Salomon et al., 2016a). Thus, here, we tested the hypothesis
that presenting an acoustic stimuli within, as opposed to outside,
PPS may bolster unconscious semantic self-processing. In this
manner, we aimed at testing a direct link between bodily and
narrative representations of the self and how they interact to
modulate awareness.
Continuous flash suppression was utilized in order to mask
presented stimuli as it has been suggested that this paradigm
allows for some sort of non-conscious physical/perceptual (Geng
et al., 2012), but not the psychological/conceptual self-processing
(Stein et al., 2016). Hence, it represents an ideal candidate to
reveal prioritized non-conscious processing by the psychological
self, when this latter one is related to its physical conception.
Lastly, self-rated personality attributes were used as these tap into
the core of the psychological self while equally being malleable
in time and self-selected by the participants themselves. That
is, in contrast to other experiments that have used a fixed set
of stimuli (e.g., Blake, 1988), here we aimed at having a set of
words that were always the same yet for some participants fell
within the “self ” category, while for other fell in the “non-self ”
category.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-five native French speakers (nine females, mean
age = 22.2 years old, range = 18–30 years old) completed
a self-attribution questionnaire (see below), out of which 23
(six females, mean age = 21.4 years old, range = 18–27 years
old) partook in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The
rest of participants were discarded from participation in the
experimental phase, as their self-reports (see below) showed a
bias in the attributes they categorized as “self ” or “non-self ” in
terms of either the word-length, or the frequency of the select
word in the French language. All participants were right-handed,
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and reported
normal hearing. The study was approved by the Brain Mind
Institute Ethics Committee for Human Behavioral Research of
the EPFL, and conducted in line with the Declaration of Helsinki.
All participants gave informed consent prior to participation and
were remunerated with 20 Swiss Francs for their time.
Self-attribution Reports
Materials, Procedure, and Analyses
Anderson’s Likableness ratings of 555 personality-trait words
(Anderson, 1968) were sorted from most to least likable
(according to the mean values in Anderson, 1968), and the
middle 200 words (word 178: hopeful to word 378: frustrated1)
were translated into French by three native French speakers. If
translators did not independently agree on the translation of an
attribute, they were asked to reach a consensus. This middle
section of Anderson’s personality-trait words was selected in
order to increase between-subject variability in self-attribution
reports (see below) while also minimizing the within-word
likability variance.
Forty-five participants completed, online and at their own
time of convenience, a self-attribution questionnaire, which
1http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~pwinkiel/words.txt
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was constituted of the translated 200 personality-trait words.
Participants were asked to rate on a Likert Scale (1 = completely
not-self to 7 = completely self) whether the attributes described
themselves (self) or not (non-self), and whether they liked the
word (also on a Likert Scale). No further instruction was given
to participants completing the questionnaire in terms of what
they should consider when judging whether a particular attribute
described them or not. Word order was randomly shuﬄed
between participants. Upon receiving participant’s response to
the self-attribution questionnaire, for each subject individually,
the list of word was sorted from most to least “self,” and the
top and lower 50 words were compared by means of a paired
t-test (alpha set at 0.05, two-tailed) for word-length, frequency
in the French language (word frequency was obtained from http:
//www.lexique.org/listes/liste_mots.php), and likability. If for a
particular subject the group of self and non-self words differed
any of the variables stated above (length, frequency, or likability),
the participant was not invited to partake in Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1
Materials and Apparatus
Visual stimuli consisted of high-contrast dynamic noise patches
suppressors (Mondrians; Jiang and He, 2006; Hesselmann and
Malach, 2011) and target stimuli. The target stimuli consisted of
one of the personality-trait words (either “self ” or “non-self ”)
in black Times New Roman, font 12 (example in Figure 1;
“Hopeful”). Background was white. Mondrians (noise stimuli)
were flashed at 10 Hz to the participants’ dominant eye, and the
targets were presented simultaneously to the other eye. A red
fixation point was presented to both eyes. The target words
we presented either above or below the fixation point in a
randomized fashion. Stimuli were presented using ExpyVR2, an
in-house custom-built multimedia stimuli presentation software
developed with Python 2.6 and the Open Graphics Library v.2.2.
The stimuli were viewed via a Head-Mounted Display (HMD:
VR1280, Immersion Inc, SXGA, 60◦ diagonal field of view,
refresh rate 60 Hz). Participants’ responses were gathered via
button-press on a gamepad (XBOX 360 controller, Microsoft,
Redmond, WA, 215 Hz sampling rate).
Procedure
Ten to 15 days after completion of the self-attribution report,
subjects were brought into the lab for completion of the
experimental phase (Experiments 1 and 2, which were ran in
a counter-balanced order across participants). Participants were
first tested for ocular dominance via the Miles test (Miles, 1930).
Then, they were instructed that on each trial, in addition to
the fixation point, which they were to gaze at, they would
see a random pattern of colorful squares. They were equally
told that, during some trials they would additionally see “a
sequence of letters.” They were instructed to press, during
the trial, a button on a gamepad if they saw this additional
stimulus. Those trials were indexed as having broke suppression,
and removed from analyses for the stimuli categorization and
location questions (see below), as we are interested in trials for
2http://lnco.epfl.ch/expyvr
which no subjective experience of the words was reported (i.e.,
unconscious self-processing). Then, as portrayed in Figure 1
(upper), subjects were informed that upon completion of a trial,
they would see the fixation point changing color: first blue,
which indicated participants were to answer to the question “Was
the additional stimuli self-related or not?”, then green, which
indicated that subjects were to answer to the question “Was
the additional stimuli presented above or below fixation?” The
questions were always asked in this order, and participants were
reassured that if they had not seen anything (apart from the
Mondrians and the fixation point) they were to simply guess. The
question related to stimuli location (above or below fixation) was
employed as a probe that some minimal form of processing was
present when suppressing self-attributes. Participants responded
via button-press, which mapping (self/non-self and above/below)
was randomized across participants.
Trial presentation (Mondrians and personality-trait words)
lasted for 3 s. Contrast of the target stimuli was ramped linearly
from zero to full contrast over the 1 s. Participants were given
unlimited time to answer both questions (Self-Attribution and
Stimulus Location). Inter-trial interval was randomly shuﬄed
between 1 and 1.5 s. The experiment consisted of 200 trials
(presentation of each of the 100 participant-specific personality-
trait attributes – 50 self and 50 non-self – twice. Once above and
once below fixation). Total experimental time was about 30 min.
Analyses
Participants’ responses were first analyzed in terms of percentage
of trials in which subjects broke suppression for self vs. non-self
words, as well as for words presented above vs. below fixation.
Then, subsequently to discarding the trials in which participants
broke suppression (e.g., participants were conscious of the
stimuli), Signal Detection Theory (SDT) analysis (sensitivity – d′,
and criterion – c) was applied to both the Self-Attribution and
Stimulus Location questions. Null effects were assessed using JZS
Bayes factor (BF) tests with default prior scales (Rouder et al.,
2012) so that a BF< 0.33 implies substantial evidence for the null
hypothesis, 0.33 < B < 3 suggests insensitivity of the data, and
B > 3 implies substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis
(see Dienes, 2011).
Experiment 2
The material and apparatus, as well as the procedure and analyses
used in and applied to Experiment 2 (which, again, was counter-
balance in order with Experiment 1 across participants) followed
largely those of Experiment 1, for the exception of the following.
In order to probe at whether an implicit association with the
bodily self, by delivery of auditory stimuli within the PPS (Noel
et al., 2015a; Serino et al., 2015; Salomon et al., 2016a), would
boost non-conscious self-processing, acoustic stimuli (white
noise) were presented both close to, and far from, the body.
Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1 (lower), a speaker (Near) was
placed 20 cm in front of the participants in the anterior-posterior
axis, at his or her midline and at sternum level, while a second
speaker (Far) was placed 100 cm away (at the same horizontal
and elevation level). The speakers emitted white noise for the
last second of trial presentation. They were both regulated in
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup and design. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with either self or non-self attributes to their non-dominant eye
(depicted; “Hopeful”), while high-contrast mondrians were flashed to their dominant eye in order to make the attributes imperceptible. Attributes were presented for
3 s while participants fixated on a red dot. Subsequently, the dot turned blue, which indicated that participants were to respond to the question, “Was the additional
stimuli self-related or not?” and then green, which indicated that subjects were to answer to the question, “Was the additional stimuli presented above or below
fixation?”. In Experiment 2, the same protocol as in Experiment 1 was repeated, but additionally a white noise sound was presented for a second (the last second of
the attribute presentation) either from the near or from the far speaker.
order to produce 70 dB(A) of sound measured at the participants’
ear. White noise was utilized (as opposed to more naturalistic
stimuli) as this stimuli has been demonstrated to most effectively
drive neurons encoding for PPS (Fogassi et al., 1996), and the
onset of the acoustic stimuli was offset with respect of onset of
visual stimuli in order to minimize the effect audio onset can
have in thrusting a visual stimuli into awareness (Aller et al.,
2015). Experiment 2, as Experiment 1, also consisted of 200 trials
(presentation of each of the 100 participant-specific personality-
trait attributes twice. Once while a near sound was presented, and
once while a far sound was presented (randomized on a trial by
trial fashion). Total experimental time was about 30 min.
RESULTS
Experiment 1
Breaking Suppression
A repeated measures ANOVA was ran on the percentage of
occasions in which self vs. non-self words broke suppression,
as well as for words presented above vs. below fixation. Results
revealed no significant difference between levels for neither Self-
Attribution [F(1,21) = 0.241, p = 0.83] or Stimulus Location
[F(1,21) = 0.832, p = 0.64], nor an interaction between
these variables [F(1,21) = 0.828, p = 0.40]. Bayesian statistics
demonstrated a BF of 0.23 in the case of the former and 1.15
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in the case of the latter. Thus, in the case of the frequency with
which self vs. non-self words broke suppression, data implies
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis. Overall, stimuli
broke suppression in about a fifth of the trials (self: M = 20.0%,
SE = 6.4%; non-self: M = 19.7%, SE = 6.4%; above: M = 19.0%,
SE= 6.5%; below: M = 20.7%, SE= 6.3%).
Self-Attribution
Sensitivity and criterion analysis on participants’ response
to the question; “Was the additional stimuli self-related or
not?” was effectuated by means of purpose-made scripts in
MATLAB (equations follow Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) and
subsequent one-sample t-test comparison to zero (meaning no
sensitivity and no bias, respectively for d’ and c). The “Self ”
category was defined as “target,” while the “Non-Self ” category
was used as “noise.” Results revealed that participants were
not able to discriminate between self and non-self words [d’;
M = −0.49, SEM = 0.27; t(22) = −1.35, p = 0.32], nor did
they show any bias [c; M = 0.03, SEM = 0.06; t(22) = −0.60,
p= 0.55]. In the case of d’, Bayesian statistical analysis suggests a
lack of sensitivity data (BF= 0.82), nonetheless, in the case of the
response bias Bayesian statistics provided substantial evidence for
the null hypothesis (BF= 0.25).
Stimulus Location
In terms of subjects’ responses to the question about Stimulus
Location; “Was the additional stimuli presented above or below
fixation?”, and defining “Above” as “target” and “Below” as
“noise,” findings revealed that participants were indeed able
to discriminate between the elevation of the personality traits
presented [d’; M = 1.24, SEM = 0.19, t(22) = 5.82, p < 0.001]
and did not show a criterion bias [c; M = 0.10, SEM = 0.05;
t(22)=−1.24, p= 0.12]. In the case of the latter, the Bayes factor
(BF= 1.1) seems to indicate a lack of sensitivity in the data.
Experiment 2
Breaking Suppression
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on the percentage
of occasions in which self vs. non-self words broke suppression,
as well as for word location (Above vs. Below fixation), as a
function of the location of sound presentation (Near or Far).
Concerning the frequency in which self vs. non-Self words
broke suppression as a function of the distance of sound
presentation, results revealed no main effect, neither for Self-
Attribution [F(1,21) = 0.83, p = 0.37], or Sound Location
[F(1,21) = 0.04, p = 0.92], nor an interaction between these
variables [F(1,21)= 0.99, p= 0.33]. In the case of the main effect
Bayesian statistics demonstrated insensitive data (all BFs> 0.62),
while in the case of the interaction these statistics provide
substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (BF= 0.18).
A similar pattern of results was observed for the frequency
with which words presented Above vs. Bellow fixation
broke suppression, as a function of Sound Location. The
repeated-measures ANOVA showed no main effect of Word
Location [F(1,21) = 0.94, p = 0.35] or Sound Location
[F(1,21) = 0.745, p = 0.41], nor an interaction between
these variables [F(1,21) = 0.56, p = 0.57]. Bayesian Factors
demonstrated substantial evidence for the null effect in the case
of breaking suppression for attributes presented above vs. below
fixation (BF = 0.22), while in the other cases Bayesian factors
demonstrated the insensitivity of the data (all BF > 0.38).
Self-Attribution
As for Experiment 1, the analysis of the self-attribution question
was performed by SDT. We compare sensitivity and criterion bias
across Sound Locations by means of a paired-samples t-test, and
subsequently, if Sound Location significantly modified either the
sensitivity or criterion to Self or Non-self attributed words, we
compared these parameters to the zero-baseline. As portrayed in
Figure 2A, results revealed that regardless of the Sound Location,
participants were not able to discriminate between Self and
Non-Self words [t(21) = −0.58, p = 0.56; d′near, M = −0.14,
SEM = 0.19; d′far, M = −0.08, SEM = 0.16], as in Experiment 1.
Further, Bayesian statistics demonstrated substantial evidence for
the null hypothesis, both for the case of close sounds (BF= 0.29)
and far sounds (BF= 0.26).
In terms of the criterion, however, as shown in Figure 2B,
findings did demonstrate a significant difference between Sound
Location levels [t(21) = 3.76, p < 0.01], revealing a more
conservative approach for identifying “Self ” when a sound was
presented Far (M = 0.07, SEM = 0.02), as opposed to when
the sound was presented Near (M = −0.003, SEM = 0.05)
to the participant. Comparisons to zero, indicated that the
“far criterion,” was indeed significantly different from no bias
[t(21) = 1.80, p = 0.03], while the “near criterion” was not
[t(21) = −0.05, p = 0.95]. These findings are further supported
by the demonstration that in the case of the latter (near sounds),
but not the former (far sounds), Bayesian statistics provided
substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (BF= 0.22).
Stimulus Location
With regard whether the target stimuli was presented above or
below fixation, analysis demonstrated no significant difference
between Sound Location levels [t(21) = −0.31, p = 0.75,
BF = 0.32]. It must be noted, however, that as depicted in
Figure 2C, and replicating the results from Experiment 1,
participants did prove to be overall sensitive to the location of the
target stimuli [d’; M= 1.05, SEM= 0.29, t(21)= 4.622, p< 0.001,
two-tailed one-sample t-test vs. zero].
Lastly, contrarily to the case of the Self-Attribution reports,
and as shown in Figure 2D, participants did not show a
systematic bias in their response to the elevation of target stimuli
as a consequence of Sound Location [t(21) = 0.338, p = 0.73].
BF was equal to 0.32, providing evidence for the postulation that
participants were equally likely to categorize unseen visual stimuli
as happening above or below fixation regardless of whether an
acoustic stimulus was presented near or far from them.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we first posed the question whether
self-relevant (vs. non-self relevant) semantic information is
preferentially unconsciously processed. In addition, we tested
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FIGURE 2 | Results from Experiment 2. Results revealed no difference in sensitivity to either categorizing attributes as “Self” or “Non-Self” (A), or for categorizing
these as being “Above” or “Below” fixation (C), regardless whether acoustic stimuli was presented near (black) or far (red) from the participant. Importantly,
participants did exhibit a significantly different from zero sensitivity in categorizing the location at which stimuli were presented. In terms of criterion bias, however,
results did reveal that participants adopted a more conservative approach to categorizing an unseen attribute as “Self” when sounds were presented far (red) as
opposed to near (black) (B). Lastly, participants showed no difference in response bias in terms of stimuli elevation when sounds were presented wither near or far
from them (D). Error bars represent ±1 SEM. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
whether such self-effect could be modulated by priming a bodily-
self representation via the presentation of a near sound within
PPS.
In line with previous studies investigating semantic processing
outside awareness (Zimba and Blake, 1983; Blake and Logothetis,
2002; Dehaene et al., 2006), our results indicate that masked
words were not processed at the semantic level – at least
inasmuch as to reveal a self-processing advantage (see Tacikowski
and Ehrsson, 2016, as well as Stein, et al., 2016). This was true
both in the case when no sounds were presented, and when
sounds were presented either close to or far from the participant.
It is important to highlight, however, that participants were
able to correctly localize the elevation of the presented unseen
visual stimuli, and thus, the lack of evidence for semantic
processing is apparent even in light of clear evidence for
lower-level subliminal processing. Blake (1988) also reported that
even the first name of a specific observer, which represents a
fundamental constituent of the semantic self (Joubert, 1991),
proved insufficient to alter dominance of one percept (self) over
another (non-self) under a condition of dichoptic stimulation.
In contrast to the traditional view, however, an array of recent
studies employing the b-CFS paradigm seem to demonstrate
high-level processing of stimuli suppressed from conscious
experience. Most notably, Jiang et al. (2007) showed that words
that were visually familiar to a specific population’s lexicon
broke suppression more readily than foreign words. Costello
et al. (2009), similarly demonstrated that semantic priming
subsequently accelerated breaking suppression of related words,
and finally Yang and Yeh (2011) reported that the affective
connotation of an unseen word altered the duration for which
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they could be maintained under suppression. It is under this
context – one that has previously indicated the presence of
semantic processing outside of awareness (Jiang et al., 2007;
Costello et al., 2009) and even evidencing congruency priming
under complete unawareness (Faivre et al., 2014; but see Noel
et al., 2015b), that the current findings are important. It may
be that the familiarity of words and their affective connotation
can be processed and even integrated outside awareness, yet
self-related and non-self related words are not differentially
prioritized, at least inasmuch as this processing would entail
a sensitive categorization of self and non-self words into their
appropriate categories unconsciously. That is, although generally
studies employing dichoptic presentation methods other than
CFS have reported limited unconscious semantic processing
(e.g., Blake, 1988), the recent surge in popularity of the CFS
method and the numerous findings indicating unconscious
processing under this paradigm has renewed interest in unveiling
unconscious semantic processing. In the current study, we thus
utilize the CFS method in order to mask self-attributes, and our
results demonstrate no prioritized unconscious processing of the
self vs. the non-self words.
On the other hand, our results revealed an interesting result
relating to a shift in the criterion bias as a consequence of the
location of sound presentation. That is, while in Experiment
1 no criterion bias was present, findings from Experiment 2
revealed a more conservative self-categorization approach (or a
more liberal other-categorization) when sounds were presented
outside, as opposed to inside, their PPS. That is, individuals
required more evidence in order to judge that the unseen word
presented was “self ” when a sound was presented far as opposed
to near. This differential response bias as a consequence of
sound location was specific for the self dimension, as we did
not observe a differential response bias among sound locations
for the indication of whether subliminal visual stimuli were
presented above or below fixation. That is, arguably, the self-other
distinction process was modified when an auditory stimulus
was provided far from the self. This effect is reminiscent of
behavioral (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2013; Teneggi et al., 2013;
Noel et al., 2015a; Salomon et al., 2016a) and neuroimaging
(Brozzoli et al., 2012, 2013) multisensory studies demonstrating a
self-other differentiation process grounded on the representation
of PPS. PPS, indeed, might represent a multisensory-motor
representation of the self in interaction with the environment
(Noel et al., 2014; Galli et al., 2015; Serino et al., 2015),
and the PPS boundaries might define a first level of self-
other distinction (Noel et al., 2016). In fact, Blanke et al.
(2015) hypothesized that changes in the size of PPS neurons
receptive fields might underpin alterations in states of bodily
self-consciousness, and we have recently demonstrated that
subjective changes in self-location co-vary with changes (i.e.,
spatial translations) in the representation of PPS (Noel et al.,
2015a) and even for unconscious manipulations of bodily self
consciousness (Salomon et al., 2016a). Here, we show that
priming the PPS boundary by presenting an auditory stimulus
within the PPS, as contrasted to a stimulus outside the PPS, can
modify the criterion with which individuals categorize stimuli
as self-related or other-related. That is, the administration of
spatially restricted exteroceptive stimuli either within or outside
the PPS alters cognitive processes with regard the self. We
find this observation particularly interesting as it seems to
imply a continuous and dynamic re-assessment to the self as
external objects and events come in contact with our sensory
modules. Importantly, this change in criterion as a consequence
of sound location, however, did not modulate the emergence of
self-attributes into awareness, but changed the post-perceptual
criterion participants used to determine whether the invisible
word was self-related or not.
CONCLUSION
It appears that though bodily representations of the self are
able to modulate access to visual awareness (Lunghi et al., 2010;
Lunghi and Alais, 2013; Salomon et al., 2015b), they do not
enhance non-conscious processing of the narrative self (or at least
association with the PPS does not). Importantly, self-attributes
did not emerge into awareness in a prioritized way, even when
presented in synchrony with exteroceptive signals that did alter
self-bias. This lack of effect could putatively emanate from an
inability of unconscious semantic processing, and not from a
lack of enhanced self-processing. Nonetheless this option is in
contrast to the results of recent studies demonstrating semantic
processing of subliminal stimuli masked by means of CFS (Yang
and Yeh, 2011; Prioli and Kahan, 2015). In conclusion, our results
demonstrate no evidence for differential processing of masked
semantic self-relevant stimuli, but do demonstrate a shift in
criterion bias as a function of whether stimuli are presented in
the peri- or extra-personal space.
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